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IV.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CHILDREN SUBSTITUTED OR CONFUSED UNJUSTLY WITH
DANGEROUSNESS AND RISK OF NONAPPEARANCE

RACE AND NATIONAL ORIGIN AS INFLUENTIAL
FACTORS IN JUVENILE DETENTION*
The Honorable Arthur L. Burnett, Sr.
INTRODUCTION

Some observers may think that there are more minority juveniles in detention
because more of them commit offenses. Others might argue, however, that more
minorities are detained because of factors unrelated to whether there is a
reasonable basis to detain. One possible explanation for the overrepresentation of
minorities in detention might be that greater police presence in minority
communities leads to the apprehension of a far greater number of minority youth
because the police observe juvenile offenses which go undetected in non-minority
or more affluent neighborhoods. Further, many minority youths may come from
single-parent families, and often there is no one available to step forward at the
initial presentation in court to satisfy the judge that the child's behavior and
conduct in the community thereafter will be properly monitored and supervised. It
is for this reason that the court should encourage a strong mentoring program,
while the youngster is in a preadjudicative status, with men and women
supervising first-offender minority youths as if they were a favorite uncle or aunt
or other close relative. Indeed, in those instances in which the child succeeds on
pretrial release to a mentor, this child could be continued on a probation status
after adjudication.
The focus of this Article, however, is on the more pervasive problem of
overzealous police officers acting on less than probable cause or even less than
reasonable articulable suspicion. Police officers may frequently act on hunches or
suspicions with the attitude that their actions will not be questioned, especially
when the victim is a minor and may not be savvy enough to know his or her legal
rights. Officers may believe they can act with impunity because of the combination
of socio-economic conditions in public housing areas and in other low-income
housing areas, or where there are a substantial number of public assistance

* This Article has been edited and substantially modified to include portions of the author's remarks at
the Symposium on June 24, 1995, and to also include recent caselaw developments in the Suptrior Court of
the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
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recipients, and because of race or national origin. Police officers, including
minority officers from impoverished backgrounds, will frequently stop minority
children and teenagers in poor, inner-city neighborhoods in situations for which
they would not stop such youngsters in more affluent areas or in primarily white
neighborhoods.
In public housing neighborhoods, areas of high population concentrations, and in
areas of high crime rates, authorities assign greater number of police. Greater
police presence is a desirable result in those neighborhoods for the law abiding
citizen who must reside there out of economic necessity.
Counsel representing minority juveniles in the juvenile system must be just as
vigilant as they are when representing adults in the adult system. They must
challenge and scrutinize law enforcement conduct to ensure that police in the
community do not cut corners on Fourth Amendment protections when arresting
and detaining minority juveniles.

I.

POLICE ACrION ON HUNCHES AND SUSPICIONS

In minority communities objective observers may well question whether police
officers sometimes seize and detain juvenile youths on less than probable cause or
less than even articulable suspicion. Are the police justified in seizing and
searching a youngster late at night in a high crime neighborhood when the
youngster looks nervous and acts in a furtive manner upon seeing a police car enter
the block? Is there a cultural factor at play here of "fear" of police authority that
causes the nervous conduct or the furtive gesture, even when the youngster has
done no wrong? Under similar circumstances a youngster in a quiet residential
neighborhood or a middle- to upper-class neighborhood in the city upon seeing a
police cruiser may well breathe a sigh of relief and wave to the officers as they
pass. Both youngsters may be equally innocent of any wrongdoing, but the chances
are significantly greater that the minority youngster will be stopped and
questioned. The following cases, nearly all involving African Americans, will
demonstrate this view.
While Anderson v. United States' involved an adult criminal prosecution, this
factual scenario can occur daily in the minority community with AfricanAmerican juveniles. To illustrate, the government in Anderson contended that the
following facts, in their totality, were sufficient to establish articulable suspicion to
1. 658 A.2d 1036 (D.C. 1995).
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justify the seizure and the subsequent frisk:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

the area was a high crime area where drug transactions take place;
appellant was standing with another man in the backyard of a house
bordering on a[n] alley during a cold winter night around midnight;
appellant quickly walked away from the police officers;
neither the defendant nor the man [with whom he was standing] resided
in the house;
appellant denied that he had been in the backyard despite being seen in
the yard by the police officers;
appellant placed his hands back in his pocket after being asked to
remove them; and
defendant became nervous, rocked back and forth, and got wide-eyed
upon being questioned.2

The appellate court noted that there was no evidence that the officer saw anything
in the defendant's pocket, let alone anything resembling a weapon or creating the
suspicion of the existence of a weapon. There had been no report or observation of
criminal activity. The court found that the officers lacked reasonable articulable
suspicion and concluded that the case was analogous to Curtis v. United States.'
The facts in Anderson were similar to the facts in Curtis, where, at 7:20 p.m., the
police officers observed the male defendant and a woman walking up an alley in a
high crime area. When the defendant heard someone yell "police officers," he
"made a motion with his hand as if to move his right arm to the left side of his
coat." 4 The officer stopped and frisked the defendant and found marijuana in a
brown package. The appellate court concluded that there could be an entirely
innocent reason for the defendant moving his right arm to the left side of his coat.
For example, he could have been responding to being startled, or if he had any
heart problems, merely reacting to a slight twinge in his chest. The appellate court
concluded that the facts "did not constitute reasonable grounds supporting a
conclusion that some particular criminal activity was afoot."" It also held that
"[iln making the initial seizure of appellant, the officers were acting merely on a
suspicion or hunch and, accordingly, the intrusion was unreasonable at its

2.
3.
4.
5.

Id. at 1038.
349 A.2d 469 (D.C. 1975).
Id. at 470.
Id. at 471.
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inception."8
Duhart v. United States7 presented a similar scenario in which the officer
observed the defendant display something to another man at 7:25 p.m. in a high
drug area. When the two men saw the officer, the defendant put the object in his
pocket, and the two men walked away in opposite directions. The defendant then
stopped and walked back toward the officer, and as he did, the officer asked what
he had in his pocket. When the defendant did not respond, the officer asked him to
take his hand out of his pocket. The defendant did not respond and again was
ordered to remove his hand from his pocket. He did so reluctantly, at which point
the officer grabbed his hand around the wrist to see what he was removing from
his pocket. At that time, the defendant turned away and began to act strangely.
When pushed up against a car by the officer, the defendant turned sideways trying
to put his right side against the car so that the pat down could not be
accomplished. Eventually, the officer conducted a pat down and found a loaded
gun. The appellate court concluded that the seizure and search was unlawful in
that the officer did not have "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting
the particular person stopped of criminal activity."'8 The court found that the
officer did not observe the object that the defendant put in his pocket and that
"citizens have no legal duty to speak to police." In reliance on these cases, the
appellate panel in Anderson concluded: "The Fourth Amendment requires that
there must be more than a person being seen in an alley late at night, walking
away from the police in a high crime area, who upon being questioned puts his
hands back in his pockets and acts in a strange manner." 10
Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have been equally vigilant in protecting
the standard of articulable suspicion required for a stop and frisk of a citizen.
1
Jones v. Maryland"
involved an African-American bicyclist at 3:20 a.m. in an
area in which there had been some recent burglaries. An officer observed the
bicyclist carrying clothing covered with a plastic bag within six blocks of a dry
6. Id.
7. 589 A.2d 895 (D.C. 1991).
8. Id. at 899.
9. Id. at 900-901.
10. Anderson, 658 A.2d at 1040. See also Tyler v. United States, 302 A.2d 748 (D.C. 1973)
(Defendant was seated in a car parked in an alley in a high crime area at approximately 3:30 a.m. It
appeared that defendant, upon investigation by officers, began to get nervous and fumbled with something in
the area of his seat. The court held it was unreasonable for the officers to open the car door and search the
car. At the time of the seizure, there was no police report accusing defendant of having a gun and there was
no reason to believe that a crime other than a parking offense had been committed.).
II. 572 A.2d 169 (Md. 1990).
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cleaning establishment. Because the officer had no knowledge of any break-in there
or any specific crimes having been committed in the area that particular night, the
court held the officer did not have reasonable suspicion justifying the stop of the
bicyclist.
Likewise, in Alfred v. Maryland,1" a police officer stopped two black males
because they were within a mile of an automobile which had been abandoned by
three or four black male robbery suspects approximately ten minutes earlier. The
court held the stop was based on no more than an inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch and there was nothing unusual about the presence of a black
male in the area.
In Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania,13 police approached defendant and his
associates upon observing the following: one was banging on a door, one was
urinating against a wall, and the other, the defendant, was walking about not
demonstrating any unusual behavior indicating that criminal conduct may have
been afoot. The court found that the police acted on an unsubstantiated hunch and
did not have sufficient cause for a stop and frisk for weapons.
In Ohio v. Rucker, 4 a police officer's suspicion was aroused simply by seeing the
defendant walk down the street and place something in his pocket or hand
something to his companion. The court stated "[i]t is apparent that the officer
acted on a hunch. A hunch is not an accepted basis for an intrusion on protected
rights. Thus, the stop of appellee violated his Fourth Amendment rights."" A
belief that a person has drugs in his or her possession is not the equivalent of
believing the person is concealing a weapon for purposes of a Terry stop.'"

12. 487 A.2d 1228 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
13. 424 A.2d 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
14. 580 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
15. Id. at 60.
16. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Rucker. the Ohio appellate court explicitly stated: "The state's
argument that drugs are the equivalent of weapons and thus a police officer's pat down of one whom he
believes to be in possession of such item is justified, demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the
court's holding in Terry and the purpose they (sic) serve in protecting Fourth Amendment rights." Rucker.
580 N.E.2d at 60. See also Anderson v. Florida, 576 So. 2d 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), which held that
the police officer did not have founded suspicion of criminal activity necessary for temporary detention of
suspect who was observed engaging in some sort of transaction with an unknown black man who appeared to
be distributing unknown items to others. A suspicious transaction taking place at midnight. and a suspect's
furtive movement at the sight of police did not show anything that could have been interpreted as dangerous
or threatening behavior to justify a stop and frisk; G.J.P. v. Florida. 469 So. 2d 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
where the court emphasized the need for "founded" suspicion and observed that the facts--that it was 7:00
p.m. in a high crime area alley where the officers observed a person in a car with another, with a bicycle
parked next to the car, and where the juvenile made a quick movement upon the officers' approach to the
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To a similar effect is Illinois v. Spann."7 In this case, the officer searched the
defendant's pocket after discovering a small bulge during a stop and protective
frisk of defendant while executing a search warrant in another individual's
apartment. The officers did not see the defendant exchange anything with that
individual, and he was doing nothing unusual when the police entered the
apartment. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that the officer at most
had a suspicion or hunch that the soft bulge was caused by a bag of cocaine, but
he could not explain how the bulge felt any different from what could have been
legitimate contents.
Also significant from Illinois is a juvenile case, In re D.D.H.1 8 This case involved
a 15 year-old juvenile shopping in a convenience store about midnight. The officer
had observed the juvenile walk up and down the aisles of the store and wave at the
officer a few times. The officer did not see the juvenile take anything from the
shelves or put anything in his coat pockets. By the officer's own admission, the
juvenile was neither committing a crime nor about to commit one at the time of
the stop. The juvenile left the store carrying a bag similar to the type one would
obtain from the store clerk after a purchase. The cashier made no attempt to stop
the juvenile, nor did the cashier contact the officer who was outside in his squad
car. The appellate court noted that mere suspicion or hunch is not sufficient to
warrant an investigative stop and concluded that the officer's stop was unlawful
under the Fourth Amendment.
This same rationale and analysis applied to adults must also be applied to police
encounters with juveniles. Juveniles are entitled to no lesser protections under our
Constitution with regard to unlawful stops, seizures, detentions, and searches than
are adults. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia and the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals have both recognized this principle in three recent
cases involving Terry stops of juveniles: In re D.E.,' 9 In re A.S., 20 and Green v.
21
United States.
In In re D.E., three police officers, acting on an informant's tip that a young
black male in a bright yellow sweater was carrying a handgun, entered an
apartment building in Southeast Washington, D.C. and spotted a male loosely
vehicle-did not add up to articulable suspicion. The court there emphasized that mere suspicion, is no better
than random selection, sheer guesswork, or hunch, which has no objective justification.
17. 604 N.E.2d 1138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
18. 581 N.E.2d 849 (II1. App. 1991).
19. 123 Daily Wash. Law Rptr. 1581 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1995).
20. 614 A.2d 534 (D.C. 1992).
21.

662 A.2d 1380 (D.C. 1995).
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matching the informant's description. 22 The officers ordered the suspect and his
three companions to stop and to lie on the floor. One of the officers testified that
the action was taken "for safety reasons because the area is known for drugrelated and violent activity, and because the information [provided by the
informant] . . . caused him to believe that others in the group might also be
armed."23 Police officers searched the suspect in the yellow sweater and recovered
a pistol, and also searched the respondent and found a handgun. 2 The respondent
moved to suppress the handgun on the ground that the frisk, search, and seizure
violated the Fourth Amendment because the informant's tip did not indicate that
2
the respondent possessed a weapon. 5
Deciding the legality of the stop and frisk under the Terry standard, the trial
judge acknowledged that "the respondent's presence with the suspect in the yellow
sweater and the discovery of the gun on the suspect could have provided legal
justification to stop and frisk the respondent.1 20 The court concluded, however,
that the timing of the stop was the critical question. The respondent was ordered
to stop before, not after, the weapon was recovered from the suspect in the yellow
sweater. The court reasoned that "there was clearly no reason to detain the
respondent at the point when he was told to stop by the police," emphasizing that
respondent's suppression motion specifically challenged the legality of the stop. 27
Based on this distinction, and the court's characterization of the informant's tip as
"vague at best,"128 the court granted the respondent's motion to suppress, noting
that the respondent was required to lie on the floor before the gun was recovered
from the person that the police believed had been described by the informant.2D
Emphasizing that "every person, even individuals encountered by the police in the
most notoriously dangerous areas of this city, are entitled to the protection of the
Fourth Amendment," the trial judge found that "the police went too far, and that
the intrusion on the respondent's privacy right [could not] be sanctioned by the
court." 30

22. In re D.E., 123 Daily Wash. Law Rptr. at 1581.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1583. See also Mayes v. United States, 653 A.2d 856, 865-66 (D.C. 1995); LeMs v. United
States, 399 A.2d 559 (D.C. 1979).
27. In re D.E., 123 Daily Wash. Law Rptr. at 1583.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1584.
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In In re A.S., the police stopped three suspects, one of whom was the
respondent, following the purchase of cocaine by an undercover police officer. At
the suppression hearing, the government's evidence showed that at approximately
7:40 p.m. an undercover officer went to the area of Fourth and Decatur Streets,
N.W., in an effort to purchase illegal drugs. The undercover officer approached
respondent, who was standing with approximately four other youths and asked
whether he was "in business."'1 Respondent asked what the officer wanted, and
she replied "a twenty." He ran north up Fourth Street, and "his friends then told
'3 2
[the undercover officer] to stand by, . . . [to] stay here and he'll be right back."
Respondent returned a short time later with a ziplock bag containing a rock-like
substance, which he gave to the undercover officer in exchange for a $20 bill, the
serial number of which had been pre-recorded. She left the area and broadcasted a
"lookout" to the arrest team in which she stated that there were "five subjects
standing on the corner, [and] all of them seemed to be dressed alike."83 The officer
described the respondent only as a black male wearing a blue jacket, gray
sweatshirt, dark jeans and a black skull cap." The lookout contained no
information of height, weight, build, facial hair, or features of the drug seller. Nor
did the lookout contain any information as to possible roles in the drug transaction,
which might have been played by the other young men standing on the corner." A
member of the arrest team testified that after hearing the lookout he proceeded to
Fourth and Decatur Streets and, from approximately half a block away, he noticed
three young men. As he approached, the officer determined that "it had to be one
of the three."3 No one from the arrest team radioed back to the officer to request
additional information that would distinguish the alleged drug seller from the
others.
The arrest team member who testified stated that he believed that the individual
for whom the broadcast was issued could have been "any of the three," and that
he "just happened to grab [respondent] and the other officers stopped the other
two people." 3 The officers frisked the three youths for weapons and found none.
They then notified the undercover officer, who drove by and identified the
respondent as the youth who had sold her drugs. An officer then searched the

31.
32.
33.

In re A.S., 614 A.2d at 535.
Id.
Id.

34.

Id.

35.
36.

Id. at 535-36.
In re A.S., 614 A.2d at 536.
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respondent and recovered the $20 bill."
Against this factual background, the appellate panel held the trial judge erred in
not granting the motion to suppress, noting that the "lookout itself alerted the
members of the arrest team that they would need additional information in order
to identify whom among the five men was the drug seller."' s Noting that the court
of appeals had rejected "associational" and "locational" taints in Smith v. United
States,39 the appellate panel reasoned that it was clear that the "kind of dragnet
seizure of three youths who resembled a generalized description cannot be squared
with the long-standing requirement for particularized, individualized suspicion." 40
The panel concluded that "[t]o allow the seizure of three people on the basis of a
generalized description that would fit many people is directly contrary to 'the
central teaching of the [Supreme] Court's Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence'
demanding specificity."

41

In Green v. United States, police officers were investigating gun activity in the
area. The officer saw the defendant "pocketing 'a small dark object' ", and then
walking away from the police activity. The arresting officer then spotted the
defendant "'peeping around the corner.' "43 The court of appeals concluded the
officer's subsequent stop and frisk of defendant was inappropriate, stating "[e]ven
taken together, [these three] facts [were] insufficient to establish grounds for a

37. Id.
38. Id. at 538. The court noted that the arrest team officer who testified at the suppression hearing
related his familiarity with the fact that "for years" young men have dressed alike in areas of the city. making
it clear that the broadcast described "a potentially staggering number of youths in the quadrant of the city
where the arrest took place." Id. Thus, the description broadcast by the undercover officer could have fit not
merely the five individuals on the corner of Fourth and Decatur Streets, N.W.. but a potentially much greater
number of youths in the area. Id. at 539.
39. 558 A.2d 312 (D.C. 1989) (en bane).
40. In re A.S., 614 A.2d at 540. See also Roy v. United States, 527 A.2d 742 (D.C. 1987).
41. In re AS., 614 A.2d at 540. See also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n.18. In this connection, judges should
recognize that many teenagers in the community dress alike. It is the "cool" thing to do. Thus, when a general
description is given of a black male in a hooded sweatshirt with baggy dark pants in his late teens or early 20Z.
it may not be unreasonable for a police officer to stop and inquire of a youngster so dressed. But the issue is
how the police officer should handle such an encounter so as to avoid crossing the line and violating that
youngster's constitutional rights. Stopping and obtaining that youngster's name and residence, and if refused,
the taking of a polaroid photograph of that person may be reasonable., but absent articulable facts that the
person has a weapon on his person, a pat down where there is no bulge would not be justified. Instead, the
officer must cease his intrusion upon the individual's liberty, mobility, and privacy and allow the youngster to
go on his way.
42. Green, 662 A.2d at 1390.
43. Id. at 1389.
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Terry stop." 44 The court gave "little or no weight" 45 to the fact that gunfire was
reported in the area. In addition, the court found that "the pocketing of an object
in such an ordinary manner does not create articulable suspicion," 4 and that the
appellant had a right to "peep" because "if a person has a right to walk away to
avoid contact with police, he also has a right to attempt to observe an area to learn
' 47
whether the police have left."
A person's exercise of his or her constitutional right to walk away and to refuse
to talk to a police officer cannot be added to the facts to create reasonable
suspicion in the mind of a police officer that criminal activity is afoot. Nor can a
person's action in walking away from a police officer be characterized as flight.45
Without other significant factors, such a detention would not be based on
reasonable suspicion. 4" Nor can officers, after only brief observations of conduct
which is at least equally consistent with non-criminal activity, justify an
investigative detention. 50 The foregoing cases are only illustrative but strongly
indicate that trial and appellate judges must be vigilant in scrutinizing law
enforcement conduct to make sure that Terry standards are maintained and that
no lesser standard is applied in minority communities than in any other geographic
area within the jurisdiction of that particular court.
Another police practice with the potential for engendering abuses in the
minority community is the use of observation posts to monitor street activity from
concealed locations. 5 1 Do police officers actually see what they claimed they saw?
When can defense lawyers convince a court that the location of the observation
post must be revealed to assure that Fourth Amendment rights are not violated?
Moreover, this is only a qualified privilege. 2 While a trial judge should endeavor
to protect the public interests that give rise to the surveillance location privilege,
that judge must also take any steps necessary to ensure accurate fact-finding and
to protect a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 3 For example, it would appear
that a trial judge could require, in connection with a suppression hearing, a

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1391.
Id. at 1390.
Id. at 1391.
Green, 662 A.2d at 1391.
Gurrola v. Texas, 877 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
Id. at 304.
Carter v. Florida, 454 So. 2d 739 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 614 A.2d 913 (D.C. 1992).
United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id.
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supplemental affidavit from the testifying officer as to the exact location of the
surveillance post.
Another option is to conduct an in camera examination of the officer outside of
the presence of the defendant and his counsel, and if satisfied, not disclose the
facts revealed to the defendant and his counsel. The affidavit or the transcript of
the in camera proceeding can be sealed for appellate review as to whether it should
have been disclosed and whether counsel for the defendant should have been
afforded access to the information and should have been allowed to use that
information in cross-examination of the witness during a suppression hearing, or
even at trial."' A trial judge would act prudently to conduct an in camera
proceeding to assure himself or herself of the credibility of the witness when it is in
doubt. 55 Further, when it appears that the information is relevant to trial issues
and its disclosure could raise a reasonable doubt, the trial judge must seriously
weigh disclosing the information, as the difference could be conviction versus
acquittal in the case. 56 Where the identification of the surveillance location is
relevant and helpful to the defense of the accused at trial, Rovairo v. United
States57 and its progeny require the disclosure of the informer's identity, where
relevant to trial, issues such as where the informer can aid in establishing an
0 in which
entrapment defense.58 Such was the situation in United States v. Foster,"
the court held that disclosure was required where, without knowing the location,
defense counsel could not effectively probe the officer's ability to identify the
defendant and the accuracy of the identification.
Finally, assuming that the curfew law for juveniles will pass constitutional
muster and appellate judicial review, 0 trial judges must be prepared for claims of
pretext and subterfuge in stopping juveniles, where guns or drugs may be seized
54. Hicks v. United States, 431 A.2d 18, 22 & n.2 (D.C. 1981).
55. While not compelled, in camera inquiry into location of the observation post may be useful in
reconciling the defendant's need for disclosure with government's interest in maintaining confidentiality of its
observation posts. Carter v. United States, 614 A.2d 913 (D.C. 1992).
56. Green, 670 F.2d at 1157 n.14.
57. 353 US. 53, 60-61 (1957).
58. See Carter v. United States, 614 A.2d 913 (D.C. 1992) (defendant seeking to compel disclosure of
location of surveillance post must show not only that some possible observation posts were obstructed, but also
that there is reason to believe that the observing officer was actually situated in such a place); Anderson v.
United States, 607 A.2d 490 (D.C. 1992) (where defendant can show that application of the privilege would
jeopardize the fairness of the proceedings, public disclosure of precise location of a concealed observation post
will be required).
59. 986 F.2d 541 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
60. D.C. Act 11-86, the Juvenile Curfew Emergency Act of 1995, 42 D.C. Reg. 3612 (approved July 6,
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incident to such stops and detentions. The first issue will be whether the law
enforcement officer could objectively believe that the juvenile was below the age to
which the curfew law applied. Using analogous precedent from other Fourth
Amendment contexts concerning pretext and subterfuge, and making reasonable
credibility decisions, trial judges should be able to prevent the abuses some people
fear would occur in the application of such a curfew law.

II.

THE DECISION TO PETITION

Once an officer makes an arrest, the issue arises as to whether the facts and
background of the juvenile justify petitioning the case-that is, the filing of
charges as to the alleged juvenile delinquent conduct. Normally, the prosecutor has
unfettered discretion in determining who to charge and what charges to bring.
This is an executive function, not subject to judicial oversight and supervision, as
part of the doctrine of separation of powers. However, as to adult prosecutions,
Supreme Court case law and District of Columbia precedent indicate that a court
does have the power to intervene where there is invidious discrimination in the
prosecution choices made. Thus prosecutions on the basis of race or national origin
cannot be justified.61 In Federov v. United States, 2 the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals extended this rationale and ruled that denial of entry into a pretrial
diversion program could not be predicated upon discouraging offenders from
exercising their First Amendment rights to protest and engage in demonstration
activities.
These cases suggest that the same standards could apply to the prosecutor in
juvenile cases. While considerations of socio-economic background of the offender
and the potential for rehabilitation might figure into the calculus of whether to "no
petition" the case, to allow participation in a pretrial diversion program, or to
petition the case for plea or adjudication by the juvenile court, there may be
circumstances in which the practices of the prosecutor in such cases could offend
equal protection principles and the precedents which apply in this area. Thus, the
prosecutor in juvenile delinquency cases must be responsive to equal protection
considerations and the principles set forth in Supreme Court and District of
Columbia doctrinal law that prosecutions cannot be based on a person's race, sex,
religion, or the exercise of constitutional or statutory rights.
61. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
62. 600 A.2d 370 (D.C. 1991).
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M.

SUPPRESSION HEARINGS AND CREDIBILITY DETERMNATIONS

One of the most difficult functions for trial judges is to make correct credibility
determinations both in suppression hearings and at trial. It has been the experience
of this judge that a case appears simple when only one officer testifies at a
suppression hearing or at a trial as to the essential facts requiring fact-finding and
a decision. However, where several officers testify, invariably there will be conflicts
in their testimony and inconsistencies. This leads to the issue whether such
conflicts or inconsistencies reflect intentional falsehoods, or whether they are
inadvertent or merely the product of different people seeing the same event from
different perspectives and with different recall. This is no different than the
function imposed upon the jury, except with a jury we have the collective
experience and wisdom of 12 people, as opposed to having that awesome
responsibility resting solely on the shoulders of one judge.
There is no simple formula for deciding who is telling the truth. The factfinder
must look at all the factors that go to credibility and to assessing an individual as a
truthful person. The judge must decide whether the officer/witness is innocently
mistaken as to a material fact or facts on which the decision will be based, or
whether the officer is adding "gloss" to justify what was an unlawful stop,
detention, or arrest. In evaluating the credibility not only of officers but of private
citizens as well, it is important to remember that not everybody who is poor and
lives in a deprived neighborhood is a liar. We have to be realistic. Judges must in
suppression hearings do what we tell jurors to do when they judge cases on the
merits-a judge should give neither greater nor lesser weight to the testimony of a
police officer merely because of his or her status as a law enforcement official.
Thus, the first cardinal rule is that a judge must fully appreciate the great
responsibility he or she has in making accurate credibility decisions, and keep an
open mind in evaluating police officer and private citizen testimony. Second, a
judge should keep at the forefront of his or her thinking and deliberative process
that a minority person, who happens to be a poor person or on public assistance,
should not be considered less credible or less worthy of belief merely because of
race or national origin. Each individual must be evaluated on his or her own
merits. If judges apply these two principles in their credibility evaluations and
factfinding, our citizens should not be critical of the quality of justice dispensed to
juvenile offenders brought before the court.
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CONCLUSION

We need to be realistic and realize that there may be some violent juvenile
offenders who must be detained in custody for some appreciable period of time to
protect the lives and well-being of law-abiding citizens in the community. While
they are in custody, there must be adequate educational programs and life-skills
and job placement training to prepare them for jobs and productive lives upon
release from custody. But we must also recognize the diversity of our population
and cultural differences in how people react to authority, and particularly how
minority youths may react in ways that lead police officers to stop and detain them
on hunches, suspicions, and less than articulable facts required by the Fourth
Amendment. Police officers and other law enforcement personnel, based on the
cases cited in this Article obviously require better training as to what constitutes
articulable facts or probable cause. Further, trial and appellate judges must be
keenly sensitive in making accurate credibility decisions, and must be vigilant in
assuring that constitutional standards are applied and maintained. 3 As our nation
becomes increasingly diverse, our law enforcement officials and our judiciary must
do an even better job of conscientiously applying Fourth Amendment standards to
all individuals wherever they may live, and without regard to race or national
origin. 64 Such an approach is absolutely essential if we are to avoid experiencing

63. Finally, in those instances where minority juveniles are adjudicated as having committed the offense,
in order to reduce minority overrepresentation in juvenile detention facilities, judges must use creative and
innovative programs of probation supervision in order to prevent recidivism. Substantive mentoring programs
with responsible adults taking a sincere interest in the juvenile and his or her future and providing guidance
and value reorientation is a good starting point. Educational deficiencies must be addressed, and educational
training for jobs which will exist in the technological era of the 21st Century must be made available to
minority youth. Employment and meaningful jobs may well be the best remedy we have to overcome the
frustration and despair which lead to repeat juvenile and criminal offenses for many individuals who otherwise
remain chronically unemployed and/or underemployed.
The best crime remedy for America is a jobs program for every individual with the physical ability and
desire to work. This must be meaningful employment in a job with a future which will give that person pride,
a sense of self-fulfillment and achievement, and stability in life. This is absolutely and indispensably required
in minority communities if we are to reduce over-representation of minority juveniles and adults in detention
and in prison in this Nation.
64. Indeed, this is necessary if citizens in our minority communities are to respect and cooperate with
law enforcement personnel in solving crimes, and if they are expected to be fair and just in deciding cases
when they serve on juries. Distrust of police officers based on police abuses and violations of constitutional
rights within minority communities can also undermine the quality of jury decisions in criminal cases and the
quality of justice administered by the courts of this nation, both state and federal. Thus, all law enforcement
officers have much to gain by correctly applying Fourth Amendment standards in their encounters with all
citizens in minority communities.
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even more divisiveness among people of different races and national origins in this
nation.
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TABLE 1: MINORITY JUVENILE DETENTION POPULATION COMPARED TO TOTAL
MINORITY POPULATION BY STATE'5

State

% Minority Juvenile
Detention Population

% Total Minority
Population

Alabama

65.6

26.2

Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota

54.5
52.7
10.0
67.3
58.4
81.0
73.5
100.0
62.9
62.1
76.0
27.3
68.3
46.9
11.8
38.5
59.3
71.7
NA
64.1
62.4
56.6
49.6

22.9
17.6
17.3
23.8
11.0
9.9
17.9
73.1
16.0
27.7
67.0
4.5
19.2
8.8
2.6
8.3
7.7
30.8
1.3
5.3
6.5
15.0
3.4

65.
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State

% Minority Juvenile

% Total Minority

Detention Population

Population

Mississippi

75.9

35.9

Missouri

61.4

11.6

Montana

NA

5.9

Nebraska

36.7

5.1

Nevada

40.0

12.5

New Hampshire

5.3

1.1

New Jersey

84.5

16.8

New Mexico

70.4

25.0

New York

83.7

20.5

North Carolina

57.4

24.2

North Dakota

0.0

4.2

Ohio

38.3

11.1

Oklahoma

55.1

14.1

Oregon

18.5

5.4

Pennsylvania

63.2

10.2

Rhode Island

NA

5.3

South Carolina

50.0

31.2

South Dakota

33.1

7.4

Tennessee

76.1

6.5

Texas

70.1

21.3

Utah

19.7

5.4

Vermont

0.0

0.9

Virginia

56.3

20.9

Washington

36.2

8.5

West Virginia

4.7

3.8

Wisconsin

69.2

5.6

Wyoming

NA

4.9

